# P.W. Bridgman an Rudolf Carnap, 19. September 1934 September 1934

My dear Professor Carnap;

This is a very belated acknowledgement of your little book The Unity of ScienceB 1934@The Unity of Science. Übersetzung und Einleitung von Max Black, London, 1934 which you were so kind as to have sent to me by the publishers last June. I received it only a short time before starting on the long summer vacation, which has been occupied with so many things of a non-academic character that I have only just now been able to find the time to read the bookB 1934@The Unity of Science. Übersetzung und Einleitung von Max Black, London, 1934 carefully enough to form any opinion about it.

In the first place I want to thank you most heartily for your thought in sending me the bookB 1934@The Unity of Science. Übersetzung und Einleitung von Max Black, London, 1934 and also for the pleasure which I have received in reading it. In general I have taken great satisfaction in the writings of the Viennese circleI Schlick-Zirkel, Wiener Kreis, including man of your own, as being more nearly akin to my own views than nearly any other analytical writing with which I am acquainted, and this last bookB 1934@The Unity of Science. Übersetzung und Einleitung von Max Black, London, 1934 of yours is no exception. The question which I asked myself with regard to the contention of your bookB 1934@The Unity of Science. Übersetzung und Einleitung von Max Black, London, 1934 was: “Does this describe what I find myself actually doing in dealing with the situations contemplated?”, and I found that it did to a very large degree and the point of view of the bookB 1934@The Unity of Science. Übersetzung und Einleitung von Max Black, London, 1934 was correspondingly satisfactory to me. However, in my own thinking there is always one element which is more prominent than it appears to be in the thinking of the Viennese circleI Schlick-Zirkel, Wiener Kreis; perhaps this is because I am primarily an experimental physicist. I find myself saying that language and thinking are human devices for dealing with certain situations and I therefore expect that although they may be highly perfected devices, nevertheless they will have imperfections and that they will not exactly meet all situations in all particulars. Hence I feel that the description in your bookB 1934@The Unity of Science. Übersetzung und Einleitung von Max Black, London, 1934 of what I do or might do in applying language to situations is an approximate description and that if I searched carefully enough I could find situations in which it would fail. This is not in itself a criticism of your thesis, for I believe that the same could be said of any thesis that? could be set up, it is rather a general commentary on a difference which I find between my general point of view and that of the Viennese circleI Schlick-Zirkel, Wiener Kreis. I have the feeling of this difference particularly with regard to logic. Logic is a tool of human thought weilded [sic] by human beings. I do not think it is a perfect tool, and I believe that there will always be conceptual situations which can never be contemplated with complete logical serenity if one pushes his analysis far enough. If the Viennese circleI Schlick-Zirkel, Wiener Kreis said things like this out loud a little more emphatically I think we would be in almost complete accord.

Most sincerely‚
P. W. Bridgman

Brief, msl., 1 Seite, RC 102-38-07; Briefkopf: fac simile: Research Laboratory of Physics, msl. Sept. 19, 1934.

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