# Carnap an Neurath, El Paso/Texas, 15. März 1943 Rudolf Carnap an Otto Neurath, 15. März 1943 März 1943

Dear Neurath‚

I suppose that you have received my letter of January 29th. Now we have come back from Minnesota without, however, any decisive result. The doctors at Mayo’s diagnosed as cause of my back trouble two slipped intervertebral disks. They did not want to make an operation now because these operations at the spine are rather complicated and therefore should not be made unless absolutely necessary. They said that there is still a fair chance for a spontaneous improvement. In this case an operation would be unnecessary. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the trouble becomes worse e. g. cause permanent pain as earliera Hsl. Einschub. in Nagel’sP Nagel, Ernest, 1901–1985, am. Philosoph, verh. mit Edith Nagel case; then they would reconsider an operation. Or if I do neither improve nor get worse for an additional long stretch of time they might also reconsider to operate.

After three weeks at Mayo’s we spent two weeks with the FeiglsP Feigl, Herbert, 1902–1988, öst.-am. Philosoph, seit 1931 verh. mit Maria Feigl P Feigl, Maria, 1904–1989, geb. Kasper, auch Kasperle, verh. mit Herbert Feigl in Minneapolis. I was very glad to see friends again after living here in the South since last summer; and to enjoy good talks, music, discussions, etc.

FeiglP Feigl, Herbert, 1902–1988, öst.-am. Philosoph, seit 1931 verh. mit Maria Feigl lent me Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph book and your Aristotelean paper.1 wie obenRussell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth; Neurath, „Universal Jargon and Terminology“. Thus I can at last reply to your comments on RussellP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph; see enclosure. It cost me a good deal of time, especially because of the very unfortunate difference in pagination, but also because I had carefully considered every remark of yours. For the general outcome look at the end.

The copy of my Semantics which I had sent you to a wrong address at Oxford came back recently. If the Post Office at Oxford had instead sent me a postal card they would have saved so much shipping space (the same happened with a copy sent to StraussP Strauss, Martin, 1907–1978, dt.-brit. Physiker und Philosoph, verh. mit Anna Strauss). In the meantimeb mean time I ordered a copy from the Harvard Press to be sent to you; I hope that will arrive. I expect the appearance of vol. II every day now – a copy will be sent to you directly from the Harvard Press.

Miss KranoldP Kranold, Candida, dt. Physikerin, Tochter von Sophie und Hermann Kranold wrote that she now teaches mathematics in a small college, would like to teach at some other place, e. g. Chicago. I gave her what little advice I had. She is also in correspondence with FeiglP Feigl, Herbert, 1902–1988, öst.-am. Philosoph, seit 1931 verh. mit Maria Feigl about teaching at Minneapolis.

I wish we too could have some human talks and technical discussions together. It would be so much easier to come to an understanding. And I should very much like to see how you both are living and working.

What a world, what a life! Bad things and hopeful things, in the world at large and in personal life including the sacro-iliac. Cordial wishes and greetings to you both,

Yours‚
Carnap

Reply to Neurath’s Comments on Russell, Meaning and Truth.
(Letter of July 17, 1942)

After some unsuccessful attempts to locate your references in Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph book I came to the conclusion that the English edition must have a different pagination, because of larger pages. I found a formula for the approximative calculation of the page numbers in the American edition, but still in some cases I could not find the places referred to. (The American edition has 445 pages.)

Engl./Amer.

p. 15/p. 14 I can explain your objection only by assuming that you did not read the whole paragraph. It seems to me that you attribute to Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph a conception which he himself does not have but only reports and even criticizes: “The behaviorist is thinking of himself as …he gives a false air of objectivity …As soon as we remember the possible fallability of the observer …”

15/15 (Naive realism.) I agree.

15/15 (The split.) I agree.

22/23 In a benevolent interpretation, we might still take this as compatible with empiricism because a sentence may be confirmable without being testable. (Compare “Testability” p. 420ff.). However, I am myself doubtful whether Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph would agree with this interpretation.

50/59 “Like SchlickP Schlick, Moritz, 1882–1936, dt.-öst. Philosoph, verh. mit Blanche Guy Schlick”. Yes. Therefore not so bad. Even if not right, still compatible with empiricism.

64/78 I do not agree with Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph, and generally not with his interpretation of not- and or-sentences. (See below). But it is not contrary to empiricism. 70/86 “As if words were not facts”. No! Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph says himself immediately after it: “Words are some among facts”. I do not see on this page any trace of absolutism.

77/94 H. By “desire”, Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph means nothing else but an occurrence in a desiring man.

92/113 H. Translatable into “something was yellow”.

104/128 H. Translatable into “No chronometer is such that, for every time point t it shows t”. You say “Why should not by chance …?” Yes, that is possible. Therefore Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph has no sufficient reason for his universal assertion; but it is nevertheless scientific, not metaphysical.

106/132 (Wave length.) I agree with you.

108/135 “God”. H. 🕮

OPO (!)c Diese unverständliche bzw. fehlerhafte Kennzeichnung entspricht derjenigen Neuraths./135 H. Translatable into “world without organisms”.

111/138 H. The discussion is entirely behavioristic; Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph does not refer to “mind” but instead to a machine which uses words.

132/164 Entirely correct and scientific, no absolutism. You probably misunderstood him. He speaks about a minimum set of premises for a given set of propositions! The whole formulation is nothing else but the customary explanation of the axiomatic method.

133/166 T.

140/176ff.d YYY-F auf falscher Seite! Unter „140“ steht „141“, die beiden Ziffern sind durch eine geschwungene Klammer verbunden; darunter auch noch „143“; unter „176ff.“ steht „178“. As far as your formulations are concerned (which unfortunately are not in agreement with your opinions) I have told you since many years that I cannot accept them, and hence I agree with the criticism of these formulations by Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph, SchlickP Schlick, Moritz, 1882–1936, dt.-öst. Philosoph, verh. mit Blanche Guy Schlick, and many others. In distinction to Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph, I know your actual conception from conversations; and I am in agreement with it. It seems to me that in your reply in “Universal Jargon” to Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph criticism you missed his point.

144/181 I agree with Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph in his criticism of your triple-involved form of protocol sentences, especially as condensed in his paragraph “This is to say …” (p. 147?–183). (I do not like his formulation with “continuity of the ego”, but it is translatable).

146/182 (Crusoe). I agree with you; but this has not much bearing on the question under discussion: the form of protocol sentences.

148/185 –

187/234 –

189/237 – (H.)

189–191/237–9 You say that “meaning” in itself is discussed, not as a social relation. I do not see that; to me the discussion seems behavioristic, not absolutistic. (I should criticize Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph discussion from the opposite side: To me it is too psychologistic.)

218/?

221/?

221/291? (Correspondence theory of truth.) T.

245/307 “As if facts and sentences were in different worlds”. Not at all. Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph says explicitely and repeatedly that he takes sentences as utterances, hence as a special kind of facts; thus they belong for him to the same world.

258/323 T.

268/?

277/347 (Real world.) Perhaps R.

281/352? Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph misunderstands our rejection of realism.

282/?

286/?

288/361 T.

289/362 –

304/?

305/?

313/392? No. The concept of degree of certainty (or confirmation) can be defined in a scientific language without any absolutism. That will be shown in a later volume of my Semantics. 🕮

315/392? –

317/398 –

321/?

321/?

329/?

340/427 I too should reject this.

347/436 (Universals.) R. 347/438 (Structure of the world.) R.

My general opinion of Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph book. As I wrote you once before, I agree with most of Nagel’sP Nagel, Ernest, 1901–1985, am. Philosoph, verh. mit Edith Nagel objections in his review; on the other hand, I think that NagelP Nagel, Ernest, 1901–1985, am. Philosoph, verh. mit Edith Nagel failed to mention the merits of the book, especially in comparison with the general run of books in epistemology.

My chief points of disagreement with Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph are the following two.

1. I object to what I should call Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph psychologism. By this I mean the lack of distinction between logical problems and psychological problems. He often begins discussing a logical problem and then inadvertently turns it into a psychological one. Herein, however, he is not guilty of metaphysics because he admits and often applies himself the behavioristic interpretation of psychology, although perhaps not quite consistently. More precisely: problems of pure semantics are misinterpreted as pragmatical problems. I don’t think that this objection of mine is in any way related to your objections to the book. On the contrary I have the impression that you (together with others of our friends e. g. NæssP Naess@Næss, Arne, 1912–2009, norweg. Philosoph, JørgensenP Jörgensen, Jörgen@Jørgensen, Jørgen, 1894–1969, dän. Philosoph, StraussP Strauss, Martin, 1907–1978, dt.-brit. Physiker und Philosoph, verh. mit Anna Strauss) often make the same mistake.

2. A more important criticism, in which I agree with you on the whole. Up to a certain point, Russell P Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph proceeds in an empiricist and behavioristic way. Then, however, his realism appears on the scene and his discussion becomes metaphysical. He discusses pseudo-problems like those of the reality of non-perceived objects, of the physical world, of universals. – This general feature holds in particular for Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph discussion of the concept of truth. Most of what he says on this concept is within the realm of an empiricist, scientific language, if we interpret it from the point of view of the semantical concept of truth. However, at certain places his realism comes through, and then his concept of truth takes on an absolutistic and metaphysical flavor. Thus I agree with your criticism of Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph concept of truth only with respect to the places of the second kind (marked above by “R”), not those of the first kind (marked by “T”).

I should like to emphasize the fact that the acceptance of the semantical concept of truth does by no means necessarily lead to the acceptance of realism. Russell’sP Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970, brit. Philosoph introduction of realism into the discussion of truth is an entirely unnecessary impurification. The semantical concept of truth (as used by TarskiP Tarski, Alfred, 1901–1983, poln.-am. Mathematiker und Logiker and myself) is entirely scientific and has nothing to do with pseudo-problems like that of realism. It seems to me that in this point you make an error based on a misunderstanding of the semantical concept of truth. I am rather disappointed that all our conversations on this point throughout the years, beginning with our talk in the train to Paris in 1935, have not succeeded in clearing up of what seems to me just a misunderstanding. In my book I have again tried to make clear the nature of the semantical concept of truth (e. g. p. 26). I refuse to give up the hope.

Carnap

Brief, msl., 1 Seite, ON 222, (Dsl. – mit hsl. Vermerk copy– ebenfalls ON 222); Briefkopf: msl. Rudolf Carnap/University of Chicago/Chicago, Illinois und El Paso, Texas, March 15, 1943.
Briefanhang: msl., 3 Seiten, ON 380/R.14-8 (Dsl. in zwei Exemplaren RC 102-56-03 und RC 102-57-07); oben msl. Rudolf Carnap und El Paso, March 15, 1943.

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