\brief[Carnap an Neurath, El Paso/Texas, 15.~März 1943]%
{Rudolf Carnap an Otto Neurath, 15. März 1943}{März 1943}\labelcn{1943-03-15-Carnap-an Neurath}

\anrede{Dear Neurath,}

\haupttext{
I suppose that you have received my letter of January 29\textsuperscript{th}. Now we have come back from Minnesota without, however, any decisive result. The doctors at Mayo's diagnosed as cause of my back trouble two slipped intervertebral disks. They did not want to make an operation now because these operations at the spine are rather complicated and therefore should not be made unless absolutely necessary. They said that there is still a fair chance for a spontaneous improvement. In this case an operation would be unnecessary. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the trouble becomes worse e.\,g. cause permanent pain as earlier\fnA{Hsl. Einschub.} in Nagel's\IN{\nagel} case; then they would reconsider an operation. Or if I do neither improve nor get worse for an additional long stretch of time they might also reconsider to operate.

After three weeks at Mayo's we spent two weeks with the Feigls\IN{\feigl}\IN{\kasper} in Minneapolis. I was very glad to see friends again after living here in the South since last summer; and to enjoy good talks, music, discussions, etc.

Feigl\IN{\feigl} lent me R\ekl{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} book and your Aristotelean paper.\fnE{\blockade{wie oben}Russell, \textit{An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth}; Neurath, ,,Universal Jargon and Terminology``.} Thus I can at last reply to your comments on Russell\IN{\russellkurz}; see enclosure. It cost me a good deal of time, especially because of the very unfortunate difference in pagination, but also because I had carefully considered every remark of yours. For the general outcome look at the end.

The copy of my Semantics which I had sent you to a wrong address at Oxford came back recently. If the Post Office at Oxford had instead sent me a postal card they would have saved so much shipping space (the same happened with a copy sent to Strauss\IN{\straussmartin}). In the meantime\fnA{\original{mean time}} I ordered a copy from the Harvard Press to be sent to you; I hope that will arrive. I expect the appearance of vol. II every day now -- a copy will be sent to you directly from the Harvard Press.

Miss Kranold\IN{\kranoldcandida} wrote that she now teaches mathematics in a small college, would like to teach \ekl{at} some other place, e.\,g. Chicago. I gave her what little advice I had. She is also in correspondence with Feigl\IN{\feigl} about teaching at Minneapolis.

I wish we too could have some human talks and technical discussions together. It would be so much easier to come to an understanding. And I should very much like to see how you both are living and working.

What a world, what a life! Bad things and hopeful things, in the world at large and in personal life including the sacro-iliac. Cordial wishes and greetings to you both,
}

\grussformel{Yours,\\Carnap}\smallskip


%\bigskip

%\bigskip

\noindent Reply to \uline{Neurath}'s Comments on \uline{Russell}, Meaning and Truth.\\(Letter of July 17, 1942)

\haupttext{
After some unsuccessful attempts to locate your references in Russell's\IN{\russellkurz} book I came to the conclusion that the English edition must have a different pagination, because of larger pages. I found a formula for the approximative calculation of the page numbers in the American edition, but still in some cases I could not find the places referred to. (The Amer\editor{ican} ed\editor{ition} has 445 pages.) %\blockade{YYY-F Seitenümbruche, Formatierung Tabelle}
\medskip

\noindent\begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{lX}
	
 \multicolumn{2}{l}{\uline{Abbreviations}:}\\

%\noindent Engl. & Amer. &  \\
%\noindent edit. & edit. &  \\ 
\noindent   \uline{H}: & This formulation of R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} is \uline{harmless} because translatable into unobjectionable, empiricist language. (Some of these formulations I myself should prefer to avoid.)\\
\noindent  \uline{T}: &This formulation about \uline{truth} is correct if meant in the sense of the semantical concept of truth. (On these points we shall not easily come to an agreement because you fail to see the difference between the semantical concept of truth, which is scientific and not absolutistic, and the realistic concept of truth, which is absolutistic and metaphysical and which is sometimes used by R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz}, see \uline{R}.)\\
\noindent  \uline{R}: & Here is a point where R\editor{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} \uline{realism} comes in, which I, of course, reject as metaphysical, like all of us.
\end{tabularx}\medskip




%\begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{rrX}

Engl./Amer.

p.\,15/p.\,14\quad I can explain your objection only by assuming that you did not read the whole paragraph. It seems to me that you attribute to R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} a conception which he himself does not have but only reports and even criticizes: ``The behaviorist is thinking of himself as \ldots\ he gives a false air of objectivity \ldots\ As soon as we remember the possible fallability of the observer \ldots''


15/15\quad (Naive realism.) I agree.

15/15\quad (The split.) I agree.

22/23\quad In a benevolent interpretation, we might still take this as compatible with empiricism because a sentence may be confirmable without being testable. (Comp\ekl{are} ``Testability'' p.~420ff.). However, I am myself doubtful whether R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} would agree with this interpretation. 

50/59\quad ``Like Schlick\IN{\schlick}''. Yes. Therefore not so bad. Even if not right, still compatible with empiricism. 

64/78\quad I do not agree with R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz}, and generally not with his interpretation of not- and or-sentences. (See below). But it is not contrary to empiricism. 
	
70/86\quad ``As if words were not facts''. No! R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} says himself immediately after it: ``Words are some among facts''. I do not see on this page any trace of absolutism. 

77/94\quad \uline{H}. By ``desire'', R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} means nothing else but an occurrence in a desiring man. 

92/113\quad \uline{H}. Translatable into ``something was yellow''. 



104/128\quad \uline{H}. Translatable into ``No chronometer is such that, for every time point t it shows t''. You say ``Why should not by chance \ldots?'' Yes, that is possible. Therefore R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} has no sufficient reason for his universal assertion; but it is nevertheless scientific, not metaphysical. 


106/132\quad (Wave length.) I agree with you. 

108/135\quad ``God''. \uline{H}. \neueseite

OPO (!)\fnAmark/135\quad \uline{H}. Translatable into ``world without organisms''. 


%\end{tabularx}



%\begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{rrX}



111/138\quad \uline{H}. The discussion is entirely behavioristic; R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} does not refer to ``mind'' but instead to a machine which uses words. 

132/164\quad Entirely correct and scientific, no absolutism. You probably misunderstood him. He speaks about a minimum set of premises for a \uline{given} set of propositions! The whole formulation is nothing else but the customary explanation of the axiomatic method. 

133/166\quad \uline{T}. 


140/176ff.\fnAmark\quad As far as your formulations are concerned (which unfortunately are not in agreement with your opinions) I have told you since many years that I cannot accept them, and hence I agree with the criticism of these formulations by R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz}, Schlick\IN{\schlick}, and many others. In distinction to R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz}, I know your actual conception from conversations; and I am in agreement with it. It seems to me that in your reply in ``Univ\editor{ersal} Jargon'' to R\editor{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} criticism you missed his point.




144/181\quad I agree with R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} in his criticism of your triple-involved form of protocol sentences, especially as condensed in his paragraph ``This is to say \ldots'' (p.~147?--183). (I do not like his formulation with ``continuity of the ego'', but it is translatable). 

146/182\quad (Crusoe). I agree with you; but this has not much bearing on the question under discussion: the form of protocol sentences. 

148/185\quad -- 

187/234\quad -- 

189/237\quad -- (\uline{H}.) 

189--191/237--9\quad You say that ``meaning'' in itself is discussed, not as a social relation. I do not see that; to me the discussion seems behavioristic, not absolutistic. (I should criticize R\editor{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} discussion from the opposite side: To me it is too psychologistic.) 

218/? 

221/? 

221/291?\quad (Correspondence theory of truth.) \uline{T}. 

%\end{tabularx}

\fnAtext{Diese unverständliche bzw. fehlerhafte Kennzeichnung entspricht derjenigen Neuraths.}


%\begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{rrX}


245/307\quad ``As if facts and sentences were in different worlds''. Not at all. R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} says explicitely and repeatedly that he takes sentences as utterances, hence as a special kind of facts; thus they belong for him to the same world. 

258/323\quad \uline{T}. 

268/?  

277/347\quad (Real world.) Perhaps \uline{R}. 

281/352?\quad R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} misunderstands our rejection of realism. 

282/?  

286/? 

288/361\quad \uline{T}. 

289/362\quad -- 

304/?  

305/?  

313/392?\quad No. The concept of degree of certainty (or confirmation) can be defined in a scientific language without any absolutism. That will be shown in a later volume of my Semantics.\fnEE{Das geschah schließlich nicht mehr im Rahmen der \textit{Studies in Semantics}, sondern erst in Carnap, \textit{Logical Foundations of Probability}.}~\neueseite{}  

315/392?\quad -- 

317/398\quad -- 

321/? 

321/?  

329/?  

340/427\quad I too should reject this. 

347/436\quad (Universals.) \uline{R}. 
347/438\quad (Structure of the world.)~\uline{R}. 
%\end{tabularx}

\fnAtext{\blockade{YYY-F auf falscher Seite!} Unter ,,140`` steht ,,141``, die beiden Ziffern sind durch eine geschwungene Klammer verbunden; darunter auch noch ,,143``; unter ,,176ff.`` steht ,,178``.}




\medskip

\noindent \uline{My general opinion of R\editor{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} book.} As I wrote you once before, I agree with most of Nagel's\IN{\nagel} objections in his review; on the other hand, I think that Nagel\IN{\nagel} failed to mention the merits of the book, especially in comparison with the general run of books in epistemology.

My chief points of disagreement with R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} are the following two.




1. I object to what I should call R\editor{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} psychologism. By this I mean the lack of distinction between logical problems and psychological problems. He often begins discussing a logical problem and then inadvertently turns it into a psychological one. Herein, however, he is not guilty of metaphysics because he admits and often applies himself the behavioristic interpretation of psychology, although perhaps not quite consistently. More precisely: problems of pure semantics are misinterpreted as pragmatical problems. I don't think that this objection of mine is in any way related to your objections to the book. On the contrary I have the impression that you (together with others of our friends e.\,g. Næss\IN{\naess}, Jørgensen\IN{\joergensen}, Strauss\IN{\straussmartin}) often make the same mistake.

2. A more important criticism, in which I agree with you on the whole. Up to a certain point, R\editor{ussell}\IN{\russellkurz} proceeds in an empiricist and behavioristic way. Then, however, his realism appears on the scene and his discussion becomes metaphysical. He discusses pseudo-problems like those of the reality of non-perceived objects, of the physical world, of universals. -- This general feature holds in particular for R\editor{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} discussion of the concept of truth. Most of what he says on this concept is within the realm of an empiricist, scientific language, if we interpret it from the point of view of the semantical concept of truth. However, at certain places his realism comes through, and then his concept of truth takes on an absolutistic and metaphysical flavor. Thus I agree with your criticism of R\editor{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} concept of truth only with respect to the places of the second kind (marked above by ``\uline{R}''), not those of the first kind (marked by ``\uline{T}'').

I should like to emphasize the fact that the acceptance of the semantical concept of truth does by no means necessarily lead to the acceptance of realism. R\editor{ussell}'s\IN{\russellkurz} introduction of realism into the discussion of truth is an entirely unnecessary impurification. The semantical concept of truth (as used by Tarski\IN{\tarski} and myself) is entirely scientific and has nothing to do with pseudo-problems like that of realism. It seems to me that in this point you make an error based on a misunderstanding of the semantical concept of truth. I am rather disappointed that all our conversations on this point throughout the years, beginning with our talk in the train to Paris in 1935, have not succeeded in clearing up of what seems to me just a misunderstanding. In my book I have again tried to make clear the nature of the semantical concept of truth (e.\,g. p.~26). I refuse to give up the hope.
}

\grussformel{Carnap}%\Apagebreak


\ebericht{Brief, msl., 1 Seite, \href{https://doi.org/10.48666/847127}{ON 222, (Dsl. -- mit hsl. Vermerk \original{copy} -- ebenfalls ON 222)}; Briefkopf: msl. \original{Rudolf Carnap/University of Chicago/Chicago, Illinois} und \original{El Paso, Texas, March 15, 1943}.\newline Briefanhang: msl., 3 Seiten, \href{https://doi.org/10.48666/846834}{ON 380/R.14-8 (Dsl. in zwei Exemplaren RC 102-56-03 und RC 102-57-07)}; oben msl. \original{Rudolf Carnap} und \original{El Paso, March 15, 1943}.}
